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Abstract
This article discusses the ability of the family firm to grow for several generations by
examining the case of the Ayala group in the Philippines. Such an ability, called here as
generational growth, has been the subject of debate regarding the future of the family firm
and the zaibatsu, which is a special type of family firm. Two features that distinguish
Ayala as a model are 1) the ability of the family to maintain ownership and management
control for generations and 2) the rejection of the use of political influence for rent
seeking.
An examination of Ayala's ownership-management system points to strategies em-
ployed for the preservation of the family's position within the firm. The quality and
process of such preservation, which family members called stewardship, is also consistent
in family and firm's political behavior. The paper proposes that the adoption of superior
stewardship strategies accompanied by skillful entrepreneurship would ensure the family's
continued ownership-management of the zaibatsu.
I Introduction
Following their predominance in prewar Japan, zaibatsu have sprouted in various parts
of Asia. The term zaibatsu is used here to refer to large conglomerates owned or
controlled by a particular family (or clan).o Because of its ability to grow to such
proportion, a zaibatsu could be treated as a special type of family firm. However, there is
a prevailing view in economics as well as in business history that expansion and growth
exert serious pressures for the transformation of family firms to other forms of modern
enterprise, especially the managerial enterprise [Chandler 1980: 13-14]. It is widely
believed that such transformation is inevitable in the long run, implying the family's loss
of control over the firm's ownership and management. Though this might be the general
rule, there are exceptions especially in Asian developing economies. A case study is
essential to show the conditions that make this exception. This paper shall focus on the
* Political Science Department, De La Salle University, 2401 Taft Ave., Manila 1004, the
Philippines
1) Family ownership is a basic defining element of the zaibatsu. See Morikawa [1992J, Fruin
[1983J and Kang [1996]. Kang provides an update and an elaborate discussion of the
definitions of zaibatsu and its Korean equivalent, the chaebol.
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case of the Ayala group of the Philippines.
The choice of Ayala is based on two unique features, which makes the model suitable
for a case study. These are, namely: 1) rejection of political favors from government and
2 ) generations of continued family ownership and management control. Particular focus
shall be made on the role of zaibatsu ownership-management structure in successful
diversification and continuity. Ayala also fits well since it is the oldest and one of largest
of the Philippine conglomerates.
Ayala's business history was reconstructed for the period 1834 to 1996, focusing on
patterns of firm growth and continuity. The period in study represented seven genera-
tions of family management. Problems of access to internal data demanded that recon-
struction of Ayala's business history be based mainly on printed sources, which fortu-
nately was sufficient for the purpose of interpreting patterns of development. While
internal data would indeed be very useful, the lack of access should not prevent the
researcher from studying and observing business group behavior. An autistic child may
not tell us what is happening in his or her world but that should not discourage the
parent, the therapist or the doctor from observing, recording, understanding, and even
experimenting to derive the desired behavior.
I combined a modified Mintzberg descriptive method [Mintzberg and Waters 1982;
Mintzberg and McHugh 1985J for inferring strategy patterns with a negative case
analytic procedure to determine the causes of Ayala's survival and growth for genera-
tions. The steps in the procedure were as follows: 1) Gather all possible data about the
company, the profiles and activities of owners and top management, and other relevant
information; 2) Establish chronological periods and infer patterns from the periods; 3)
Check the consistency of preliminary proposition with the data; 4) Formulate or modify
the existing proposition; 5) Examine details of data in the light of new perspective; and
6) Repeat steps 3 to 5 until consistency with data has been achieved.
Interpretation of Ayala's business history was first based on the working proposition
that entrepreneurship, a stable family and a low degree of political involvement led to the
zaibatsu's growth for successive generations. This proposition was generally observed
for the period 1834 to 1980 but was overturned when certain episodes immediately
thereafter questioned the strength of both entrepreneurship and family stability. These
episodes involved the last years of management by Enrique Zobel (or Enzo), first
president, CEO and chairman of Ayala Corporation (AC).2) Though Enzo was responsible
for AC's formation as a large conglomerate, his replacement and disengagement from
majority owners within the family as well as AC's remarkable development afterwards
led to a modification of the original proposition regarding generational growth.
This article presents the results of the above-mentioned study. I shall first briefly
introduce Ayala's present status followed by its business history focusing on the period
2) A List of Abbreviations could be found after the main text.
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1914 to 1996. The historical overview serves as a base for analyzing patterns in the
management of growth and diversification. I conclude by suggesting key elements for
the zaibatsu's continued growth based on the model.
II Ayala's Present Status
From a minor zaibatsu during the first half of the century, Ayala has become the largest
Philippine zaibatsu in the post-Marcos period. The Zobel de Ayala family through
Mermac, Inc., currently controls AC, a holding company for a diversified group of
companies. Based on 1995 data, it headed the list of the top Filipino family holding
companies (Table 1).
Mermac itself was ranked no. 92 with 3.1 billion pesos in sales and 3.08 billion pesos
Table 1 Top Five Zaibatsu of the Philippines, 1995




41 Ayala Corporation Zobel de Ayala 6,016
105 JG Summit Holdings Gokongwei 2,914
101 SM Prime Holdings Sy 2,973
288 Aboitiz Equity Ventures Aboitiz 1,205
187 Benpres Holdings, Inc. Lopez 1,744
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Fig. 1 Growth in Assets, Revenues, Equity and Net Income, Ayala Corp. 1974-96
Source: [Ayala Corporation 1975-1996J
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in profits. AC performance from 1974 to 1996 showed a steady upward trend (Fig. 1).
More famous as a real estate conglomerate, AC has diversified into several business and
social concerns as shown in Appendix 1. Thirty of these member companies have been
also listed among the SEC's top 5,000 corporations for 1994.
ill Historical Overview 3)
1. Origins and Diversification to Insurance and Real Estate, 1914-45
Ayala Corporation (or AC) traced its history to the 1834 partnership of Domingo Roxas
and Antonio de Ayala (Table 2), who later married the former's daughter. The partner-
ship was engaged in the production of liquor. In 1914, the Ayala clan consisting of the
Zobel, Roxas and Soriano branches divided their properties, which led to the Zobel de
Ayala family's ownership of AC, then a partnership known as Ayala y Compania.
Enrique and Consuelo Zobel's children-Alfonso, Jacobo and Mercedes-inherited a
1,616-hectare hacienda known as Hacienda de Makati.
The erstwhile Zobel matriarch, Trinidad, passed away in 1918 leaving her children,
Fernando, Enrique and Margarita (see Appendix 2 for genealogy), to run AC. A decade
earlier, the family decided to go into insurance facilitated by a particular resource,
Antonio Melian, Margarita's husband. Melian was involved in insurance and trading in
Table 2 Ayala Business Family Managers, 1834 to Present
I. Founding Partners, 1834
-D-o-m-in-g-o-R-o-x-a~s-(-1-8-34--~1-8-4-3)-------1 Antonio de Ayala (1834-1876)
II. Succeeding Managing Partners
-J-o-se-B-o-n-if-a-c-io-R-o-x-a-s-(-I-S-4-3--1-S-6-3)----1 Mariano Roxas (1S43-1864)
Margarita Roxas de Ayala (1843-1869)
Pedro Roxas (1876-1891) Jacobo Zobel Zangroniz (1876-1895)
Carmen de Ayala de Roxas (1891-1913) Trinidad de Ayala de Zobel (1891-1918)
Enrique Zobel de Ayala (1901-1943) Fernando Zobel de Ayala (1910-1927)
Antonio Melian (1918-1926)
Jacobo Zobel y Roxas (1929-1941) Fernando Zobel de Ayala y Montojo (1955-1961)
Alfonso Zobel de Ayala (1929-1965) Joseph R. McMicking (1931-1967)
m. Ayala Corporation Presidents
Enrique Zobel (1967-1983) Jaime Zobel de Ayala (1983-1994);(Board Chairman, 1983-present)
Jaime Augusto Zobel de Ayala (1994-present)
Source: [Ayala Corporation 1984J
Note: Bold lines indicate family management generations. The present president represents
seventh generation.
the
3) A more comprehensive business history has been prepared as part of the author's doctoral
dissertation.
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Peru but after travelling to the Philippines, decided to stay in the country. Together, the
Zobels organized a number of Filipino-owned insurance companies including El Hogar
(1910), Filipinas Compania de Seguros (1917) and Philippine Guaranty Company (1917).
They also invested in Insular Life Assurance Co., established in November 1910 as the
first Filipino-owned life insurance company.
The insurance industry at that time was one dominated by foreign players. Success-
ful entry into the industry by Filipinos hinged on two prevailing practices among foreign
firms. First, there were racial or national prejudices toward different types of policyhold-
ers. These prejudices were shown in the differences in the amounts of premiums sold to
Filipino and foreign nationals. Second, the time spent to settle insurance claims was too
long. Among the foreign firms, the decision had to come from the head offices in London
or the United States. By correcting these practices, Filipino insurance companies were
able to successfully penetrate the industry.
In the 1920s, the Ayala partners set up the China Underwriters Life in Hong Kong
(1924) and also opened Filipinas Life Assurance Company (1927) in the Philippines. Times
seemed tough from the mid-1920s to the 1930s. According to Lachica [1984: 142J, the
family experienced serious liquidity problems. In 1924, AC sold its distillery business to
Carlos Palanca, a Filipino-Chinese businessman who later became known as the "alcohol
king." Then in 1929, Enrique's three children entered Hacienda Makati as assets into the
partnership. Of the original 1,616 hectares, 700 hectares were subdivided and sold in the
following decade. This represented AC's initial diversification to real estate development.
2. The Zobel-McMicking Team, 1945-68
After the Second World War, ownership and management passed on to Enrique and
Consuelo's children. The managing team was basically composed of Alfonso Zobel and
Joseph R. McMicking (JRM), husband of Mercedes (sister of Alfonso). The other brother,
Jacobo, sold his shares to the other partners because he preferred military service to a
business career. JRM was considered as the one responsible for converting the family
firm to a professional organization.
During the war, he was a colonel working for General MacArthur's intelligence
department. Alfonso Zobel stayed on in the Philippines, looking over the family prop-
erties and businesses. In 1948, under these two people's management, AC embarked on a
25-year project for the development of Makati. This started with the successful launch-
ing of Forbes Park, a community targeted for the rich. Makati was offered as an
alternative to war-torn Manila as a residential, business and commercial district.
To this end, AC adopted a strategy of getting the rich first and by creating an image
of opulence, everybody would follow. Several details were required for realizing this
strategy but it worked anyway. The success of Forbes Park was followed by the
development of other subdivisions in Makati for upper- and middle-class groups. Hotels,
office buildings, commercial centers and parking facilities followed.
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By the 1960s, AC established itself as the country's most successful real estate
developer. It was also becoming clear that the company's Makati land inventory was
becoming exhausted and that future sources of income had to be tapped. With huge
reserves earned from its profitable real estate ventures, the company decided to take two
main courses of action.
The first course of action involved creating more value for its existing Makati
properties (such as expanding and upgrading the Makati Commercial Center) as well as
expanding the real estate business's geographical reach. The company also contemplated
on the export of its expertise. Up to the late 1960s, these were yet plans in the design
stage.
The second course of action was diversification. This was effectively carried out in
the 1960s. In view of the 1974 expiration of the Laurel-Langley agreement, which granted
American nationals special economic privileges, many American big businessmen were
withdrawing from the country. As such, tremendous opportunities existed for takeover
by Filipino firms.
The Ayala partners chose banking and finance rather than large utilities companies
such as the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) and Philippine Long Distance Com-
pany (PLDT). According to Alfonso's grandson, Jaime Augusto, his grandfather was
"always nervous about those businesses" [Marasigan 1994: 27]. Instead, from 1962 to 1965,
the company gradually acquired from American stockholders the controlling interest of
the People's Bank and Trust Company (PBTC). Also, in 1965 the company bought sub-
stantial shares of Pure Foods Corporation, a processed meat producer and food distribu-
tor. However, it was not until 1981 when a clear majority stake was acquired that the
Pure Foods Corp. was designated as an AC subsidiary.
3. From Partnership to Corporation: The Enzo Administration, 1968-83
Alfonso Zobel died in 1967 and JRM retired in the following year based on a policy that
he set that everybody at AC should retire at the age of 60. On February 2, 1968, a new
team of family members was appointed to manage the company. The team was
composed of Enrique Zobel y Olgado (otherwise known as Enzo) and Jaime Zobel de
Ayala (JZA). The formal appointments coincided with the conversion of Ayala from a
partnership to a corporation.
Enzo, elected as chairman, president and chief executive officer (CEO), was the son of
Jacobo Zobel, brother of Alfonso. His participation in Ayala was based on initial loans
provided by the McMickings. JZA was elected vice-chairman and handled administra-
tion, insurance and personnel.
AC's parent company was Mermac, Inc., which stood for Mercedes McMicking, the
wife of Joseph McMicking. As Lachica [1984: 160J noted, "In her quiet way, most major
decisions and appointments were hers. She exercised it with advice and the power to
deny. It is therefore to her that a major credit of what Ayala is today belongs." Thus,
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based on this setup, the true controlling interests of AC were the McMickings, acting
primarily as capitalists while the two younger family members, Enzo and JZA acted
essentially as managers (though they had some shares in the company). This mirrored
the 19th century setup when Ayala y Cia was basically owned by the sisters, Trinidad
and Carmen de Ayala, and managed by their spouses.
Under Enzo's administration, the company resumed its expansion and diversification
activities but with a faster pace. By 1976, AC (excluding those owned or controlled by
Zobel family members) had about 40 subsidiaries and affiliates (Table 3).
Corporate expansion and diversification activities were therefore not seriously af-
fected by the martial law administration, which witnessed the government takeover of
companies owned by other traditional business families such as the Lopezes. One reason
in part was that the Zobels did not engage in partisan politics though they voiced out
opinions on behalf of the business community. Another reason was that the company
adopted protective measures anchored on alliances with foreign and local business
groups. Tie-ups with foreign business groups were effective since the government
worked to attract foreign investments and relied on foreign loans for development
administration. In 1973, AC invited four Mitsubishi companies to buy in 20 percent of the
company's stock.
The same strategy applied for AC's banking arm. In 1969, AC became the Bank of
Philippine Islands' (BPI) single largest shareholder by acquiring the controlling shares
from the Manila (Roman Catholic) Archdiocese. Thus, two banking institutions came
under AC control (BPI and PBTC). In 1972, following the declaration of martial law, the
Central Bank required that all commercial banks have a minimum capitalization of 100
million pesos.
Two measures were undertaken. First AC invited Morgan Guaranty Trust of New
York to acquire 30 percent equity in PBTC. Then it worked for a merger between PBTC
and BPI. In January 1994, the merger between the two banks was completed, retaining
BPI's name as the surviving bank. Enzo was elected chairman of the board of directors.
He became president and CEO in March 1979.
Another defensive strategy was the formal expression of support to government
programs. During the early martial law years, AC announced that it would expand to
promising commercial and industrial ventures that were export-oriented in line with the
government's investment priorities. Further, AC intensified involvement in hotels which
dovetailed with government's priorities on tourism.
With these political defensive strategies in force, diversification and expansion
proceeded during the Marcos regime. Real estate development activities continued to
reap success with 1) the rapid transformation of Makati as a commercial and business
center, and 2) the replication of Makati's development in other areas such as Davao and
Alabang. In food and agribusiness, AC took over and improved the management of Pure
Foods in 1981.
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Name of Subsidiary / Affiliate
Bank of the Philippine Islands
Ayala Investment & Development Corp.
Ayala Investment Management, Inc.
Makati Leasing & Finance Corp.
Philsec Investment Corp.
Ayala Finance (Hong Kong), Ltd.
AF Money Brokers, Inc.
The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd.
Filipinas Life Assurance Co.
FGU Insurance Corp.
The Philippine Guaranty Co., Inc.
Universal Reinsurance Corp. (Phils')
China Underwriters Life & General
Insurance Co., Ltd. (Hong Kong)
Universal Life & General Insurance
Legaspi Oil Co., Inc.
Cagayan de Oro Oil Co., Inc.
Connell Bros. Co. (Phils.)
Makati Machinery & Equipment Co.
Beta Electrical Co., Inc.
Philippine Overseas Trading
Globe-Mackay Cable & Radio Corp.
Pan Pacific Commodities Corp.
Palawan Apitong Corp.
Acme Engineering & Management
Association, Inc.
Luzon Inter-Coast Co., Inc.
Diamond Cement & Industrial Corp.
Agusan Wood Industries





Manila Peninsula Hotel, Inc.
Davao Insular Hotel Co., Inc.
Calatagan Resort, Inc. (Punta Baluarte)
Foreign Partner (s)
J. P. Morgan Overseas Capital
Wells Fargo Bank International
U. S. Leasing International Inc.;













Japan Air Lines Development
Co.. Ltd.
Mitsui Group; The Bank of
Tokyo, Ltd.; Taisho Marine
& Fire Insurance
Hongkong & Shanghai Hotels,
Ltd.; Hongkong & Kowloon





Lapanday Agricultural & Development Corp.
Davao Grains, Inc.
San Antonio Meat Industries
Ayala Realty Development Corp.
Makati Development Corp.
Darong Development Corp.
Source: [Ignacio 1983: 298-300J
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Further in 1974, AC and its partner Mitsubishi acquired an American firm, Legaspi
Oil Co., which was the largest coconut oil miller in Southeast Asia with the largest copra
buying network. Legaspi Oil was a member of the three-company copra oligopoly that
also included Granexport Manufacturing and Lu Do & Lu Ym. However, AC and partner
were eased out in 1978 when Marcos and his business allies decided to corner the coconut
industry. Reentry into the agribusiness industry was made in 1981 with the formation of
Ayala Agricultural Development Corporation (AADC), a company engaged in the produc-
tion and distribution of corn seeds from materials and technology supplied by Pioneer
Overseas Corporation, an American firm.
AC also extended its presence to commerce and services. It entered trading and
distribution in 1975 through the acquisition of majority control of Connel Brothers as
well as Makati Machinery and Equipment Co. In 1980, Ayala Trading was organized as
a division to export mangoes, bananas, toys, garments, plywood and wood products.
Offices were organized in San Francisco, Tokyo, Hong Kong and Singapore. Likewise,
AC gained majority control of Globe Mackay Cable & Radio Co. (GMCR), a leader in
telegram, telex and facsimile services.
In manufacturing, more firms came under AC's portfolio starting in the mid-1970s. It
was not clear why AC went into manufacturing but entry in this sector was facilitated by
joint ventures, which was an increasing trend for expansion by domestic firms in those
days. In 1976, with Mitsubishi, AC acquired the majority stake in D. O. Plaza Enterprises
(subsequently renamed as Agusan Woods), a company engaged in wood and wood
products. In 1978, a joint venture project was established with German firms for the
production of "powernet," a raw material for garments. Then, in 1980, Integrated
Microelectronics, Inc. (IM!) was formed as a joint venture with the Carlos family for the
assembly and export of semiconductors. IMI clients were initially American computer
firms. Finally, in March 1991, Ayala secured majority ownership of Integrated Polymers
Corp., a firm engaged in the manufacture of polyurethane products for export.
In banking, Enzo made BPI become more aggressive while keeping it solvent. For
instance, branch operations were enlarged from 29 in 1974 to 47 in 1975. Geographical
expansion was also pursued outside of the country. In 1980, BPI and AC established the
Asian International Bank in New York. Also, BPI partnered with Bruneian businessmen
for the establishment of Island Development Bank (Brunei) Ltd. In the Philippines, BPI
was in an acquisitive mode. It acquired the Commercial Bank and Trust Company in
1981. AC also had a 40-percent equity in Banco de Oro but later sold it when it deemed
that it could not be in the majority position. Further, in 1981, both BPI and AC tried to
bid for Banco Filipino (BF) when the latter was having serious internal problems.
In insurance, Enzo engineered the mutualization of Insular Life Assurance Co. This
meant that ownership of the company would be passed on from 173 stockholders to over
180,000 policyholders. The amount of sale of AC shares (prior to interest charges on
installment) was 255.8 million pesos or about 40 percent of AC's total assets in 1976. With
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Insular Life's mutualization, AC then positioned its other insurance companies to serve
particular market segments: Filipinas Life for ind ustrial or group life insurance, FGU for
non-life, and Universal Reinsurance for professional reinsurance services.
In finance, AC had a subsidiary, the Ayala Investment & Development Corp., an
investment house active in stock brokering, money-market operations, and corporate
financing. In 1978, AIDC was the third largest investment house in terms of revenues the
Philippines but was a rapidly growing concern with returns on equity of 25.6 percent in
1978,31.6 percent in 1979 and 28.2 percent in 1980.
The Enzo administration began to crumble starting in late 1980. In December 1980, a
number of long-time, top level executives resigned their posts, including AIDC president
Jovencio Cinco. In January 1981, the Dewey Dee scandal struck, which saw the default by
officers of Continental Manufacturing Corp. on a 37-day AIDC loan amounting to 4.5
million pesos. AIDC was formally absorbed by BPI two years later. In 1982, AC began to
divest various businesses.
Then, in January 1983, Enzo engaged in a costly boardroom battle against the
Soriano leadership of San Miguel Corporation. The Sorianos won the battle. However,
both Enzo and the Soriano sold back shares, which ended up in the hands of Marcos ally,
Eduardo Cojuangco. The latter became the largest controlling interest of San Miguel.
This series of fiascoes must have cost Enzo his presidency. In October 1983, at the age of
57 he retired from the company. Enzo was replaced by cousin Jaime Zobel de Ayala (JZA).
His shares at Ayala were bought back by Mermac but in exchange Enzo acquired Ayala
International. Relationships with family members became more strained later.
4. Management after Enzo: jZA and Sons
JZA's succession came at a time of national political and economic crisis. In August 1983,
political leader Benigno Aquino was assassinated, sparking a civil disobedience move-
ment up to February 1986. Also, a prolonged financial crisis was triggered resulting in
capital flight and dollar salting. JZA responded by employing certain survival strategies.
First, in 1983-84, AC improved its liquidity and solvency positions by retiring major
liabilities. Second, it undertook cost cutting programs that reduced expenses by 28
million pesos in 1985.
Third, AC consolidated its positions in a few chosen industries such as banking,
electronics, food and agribusiness while divesting most of its manufacturing businesses.
In 1984, BPI absorbed the Family Bank & Trust Co., forming a new subsidiary in
consumer banking known as BPI Family Bank. Pure Foods likewise consolidated its
market position by establishing an integrated poultry business comprising of poultry
production and feedmill operations.
Fourth, AC promoted synergy such as BPI's intermediation for foreign exchange
reallocation between importing and exporting subsidiaries during the foreign exchange
shortage of the mid-1980s [Marasigan 1997]. Finally, AC launched a reorganization
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program that streamlined management, and screening managers of their loyalty, intelli-
gence and experience. Through these strategies, AC was not only able to survive but
emerged as the largest family-controlled conglomerate in the post-Marcos era.
Koike [1993b] examined AC's activities, strategies and ownership-management struc-
ture during the Aquino administration. By way of summary, Ayala grew stronger as a
diversified conglomerate with effective management controls during the said administra-
tion (1986-92) and extending to the Ramos period (1992-98). In December 1994, at the age
of 60, JZA retired as president but retained the chairmanship. Jaime Augusto (JAZA), his
son, succeeded him.
JAZA, an economics graduate with an MBA degree from Harvard University, said
that his primary role as president was to "make sure that all our companies are capital-
ized properly and make sure that the right persons are in the right place to have the
dynamism necessary" [Young 1995]. The other family member in the top management
was Fernando, JAZA's brother. Fernando was in charge of international operations,
which had yet to recover following the sale of Ayala International to Enzo in 1983.
From 1986 to 1996, AC's major diversification activities could be characterized as: 1)
corporate reorganization and transformation of AC into a pure holding company, 2) AC's
diversification into new fields and 3) diversification and expansion of subsidiaries and
affiliates.
In 1988, AC proceeded to become a pure holding company by spinning off its real
estate business, resulting in the formation of Ayala Land, Inc. (ALI). Then, hotel sub-
sidiaries were placed under a new holding company, Ayala Hotels, Inc. (AHI), in which
both AC and ALI each had 50 percent share. ALI managed AC's real estate, hotel and
related businesses.
These moves were part of the reorganization that began in 1983 experimenting on the
best ways of managing a diverse portfolio of businesses. Lead directors were appointed
to head a konzern, or an umbrella of direct subsidiaries and affiliates. As shown in
Appendix 1, by 1996, there were about 18 direct subsidiaries and affiliates organized
under seven to eight konzerns. There were seven senior managing directors and 16
managing directors who supervised Ayala's deep portfolio structure.
As a pure holding company, one of AC's jobs was to look for new opportunities that
can be exploited. From 1986 to 1996, the company entered into information technology,
automotive, utilities and infrastructure-related businesses. Further, telecommunications
affiliate, GMCR, was reorganized as a joint venture Globe Telecoms so that the company
could join the deregulated telephone industry. Entry into information technology was
represented by two subsidiaries, namely: Ayala Systems Technology, Inc. (ASTI) and
EDINet Philippines.
ASTI, formed in 1988, was engaged in computer marketing, software and consul-
tancy. EDINet provided electronic documentation and transactions services for large
institutions. In 1994, the two companies were assigned to Rizalino Favila, a former IBM
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executive. The two companies worked closely with Globe Telecoms, headed by Filemon
Berba, formerly of Westinghouse Asia Controls Corporation. These three companies
represented AC's new thrust in high technology businesses.
AC also took advantage of the Philippine automotive industry, which resumed
growth since the late 1980s. In 1990, the company entered into a joint venture with the
Yuchengco 4) group's Rizal Commercial & Banking Corp. (RCBC), Mitsubishi Corp. and
Honda Motors for the assembly and sale of Honda Cars. By 1996, Honda Cars led the
passenger car market by capturing a 26 percent share. Then in 1995, AC, RCBC and
Mitsubishi once again teamed up to assemble and sell Isuzu brand vehicles. In these two
automotive businesses, AC and RCBC each held a 15 percent share of subscribed and
paid-up capital.
Then, in 1996, AC entered into transportation-related infrastructure as well as water
utilities. The company won a privatization contract from the government Metropolitan
Table 4 Financial Operations by Business Segments Ayala Corporation, 1990-96
(In Million Pesos)
Revenues 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Parent Co./Financial Services/Telecommunications 505 1,333 690 742 4,233 3,175 3,518
Real Estate & Hotels 2,340 3,519 3,518 4,904 8,056 9,336 12,136
Food Manufacturing Services & Agribusiness 3,589 4,710 5,372 5,831 6,657 7,271 8,475
Insurance 1,157 1,388 1,735 2,213 2,295 2,679 3,211
Electronics & Information Technology 931 853 684 513 744 1,481 2,273
International & Others 298 595 570 416 13
Net Income 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Parent Co./Financial Services/Telecommunications 357 1,136 487 394 2,707 2,366 1,821
Real Estate & Hotels 724 867 1,026 1,238 1,904 2,318 3,514
Food Manufacturing Services & Agribusiness 151 111 108 44 106 197 36
Insurance 24 15 40 181 284 525 694
Electronics & Information Technology 37 - 100 - 116 -11 - 31 72 206
International & Others 59 194 225 5 - 42
Total Assets 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Parent Co./Financial Services/Telecommunications 2,132 2,907 3,216 4,437 9,199 17,257 25,467
Real Estate & Hotels 4,939 9,432 10,189 16,203 24,163 27,052 35,537
Food Manufacturing Services & Agribusiness 2,317 3,179 4,712 5,075 5,220 5,762 6,209
Insurance 1,958 2,111 2,318 2,610 3,124 4,435 8,234
Electronics & Information Technology 1,085 1,195 955 769 925 1,402 1,905
International & Others 302 599 533 597 573
Source: [Ayala Corporation 1991-1996J
Notes: Venture into the telephone industry started in 1993. Figures for International & Others
were split with Electronics & IT beginning in 1993. International operations included
trading and marketing operations as well as investments in overseas projects. Others
included air charter services and joint ventures with companies in automotive assembly.
4) Former ambassador to China during the Aquino administration and to Japan during the
Ramos administration.
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Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) to provide water supply in Metro Manila's
East Zone. For this, AC formed the Manila Water Company, a joint venture with United
Utilities and Bechtel of the United States. The company also joined a consortium to
construct an 18-kilometer rail transit system that spanned the Epifanio de los Santos
Avenue (EDSA). EDSA traversed four important Metro Manila cities and towns includ-
ing Pasay and Makati in the south as well as Mandaluyong and Quezon City in the north.
As of 1996, the banking 5 ) and real estate segments remained the biggest contributors
to AC revenues and net income (Table 4). Real estate and hotels was the largest income
earner with a share of 56 percent of consolidated profits. An inter-segment comparison
indicated low aggregate annual returns to total assets by other business segments despite
their leadership in their respective industries. Interestingly, the profit contribution of the
food and agribusiness segment declined while insurance began to climb rapidly in 1993.
Profits from the insurance segment, which had suffered since Insular Life's mutualiza-
tion, showed an upward trend such that by 1996, it registered an 11 percent share of
consolidated income.
IV Patterns in Ayala's Conglomerate Formation
Rapid conglomeration began in the mid-1960s (Fig. 2) with ownership and management
effectively remaining in family hands. As of end of December 1996, Mermac held about
60 percent of AC's outstanding shares. As could be seen from Figs. 2 and 4, amidst
varying political and economic environments, the transformation from family firm to a
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Fig. 2 Diversification Patterns
5) Globe Telecommunications was still experiencing losses during the period.
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Initial attempts at conglomeration was facilitated by a combination of internal
conditions that included 1) Enzo's aggressive empire building behavior, 2) huge profits
generated from the Makati development and 3) the recruitment of a growing supply of
managers. From 1914 to 1983, Zobel family relations were also generally stable with no
significant effects on the firm reported.
Enzo was an aggressive empire-builder, who was "more involved in operations so he
needed a strong staff to back him up" [Marasigan 1994: 28]. Observers and company
insiders have seen him as possessing a strong personality and autocratic management
style. When compared with JZA, former AC senior vice-president Renato Buhain
commented, "We accumulated more businesses with EZ but Jaime tends to focus on
certain fields. But both contributed to the company" [ibid.].
Little financial information could be obtained until AC's listing with the stock
exchanges in 1976. Nevertheless, the extent of AC's financial power could already be seen
at such an early stage of conglomeration: In 1974, current assets and investments
Table 5 Number of Top-Level Management Executives, 1975-96 (Excludes President)
Year
Executive Senior
Vice- Presidents Assistant Senior Division Division Total No. FM Rank
Vice·President Vice-Presidents Vice-Presidents Managers Managers No. of FM
1975 0 1 8 0 9 9 27 1 SVP
1976 1 2 10 0 6 14 32 1 SVP
1977 1 3 8 0 12 13 37 1 EVP
1978 1 3 11 0 13 24 52 1 EVP
1979 1 3 15 11 12 20 62 1 EVP
1980 1 5 15 15 13 26 75 2 EVP SDM
1981 1 5 15 15 13 26 75 2 EVP SDM
1982 1 5 10 13 25 28 82 2 EVP SDM
1983 0 4 14 14 21 24 77 1 SDM
1984 0 5 14 18 18 20 75 2 SDM DM
1985 0 6 12 17 17 22 74 2 SDM DM
1986 0 5 12 19 21 14 71 2 SDM SDM
1987 0 5 11 21 23 10 70 2 AVP SDM
1988 0 5 12 12 15 8 52 1 VP
1989 0 6 15 9 14 4 48 1 VP
1990 0 5 15 8 16 3 47 1 VP
1991 0 4 18 10 15 9 56 1 VP
1992 0 7 15 7 15 11 55 1 SVP
1993 0 7 16 7 17 9 56 1 SVP
1994 0 6 16 7 15 10 54 1 SVP
Year
Senior Managing Managing Associate
Total No. No. of FM FM RankDirectors Directors Directors
1995 7 16 20 43 SVP
1996 7 17 21 45 SVP
Source: [Ayala Corporation 1975-1996J
Notes: 1. For 1995, the adviser to Chairman and Consultant seemed to have the rank of Senior
Managing Director
2. Associate Directors had the previous rank of senior division managers.
3. For 1975 to 1976, Corporate Secretary was considered here with the rank of vice-
president, which was formally made in 1977.
Legend: SVP-Senior Vice President; EVP-Executive Vice-President; SDM-Senior Division Manager
AVP-Assistant Vice-President; VP-Vice President; FM-Family Member
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constituted 88 percent of company assets (Appendix 3). Further, Table 5 would show
that as the company accumulated more businesses, the number of top executives rose
starting from 27 in 1975 and peaking to 82 in 1982.
Fig. 3 however indicates that conglomeration was rapidly being achieved through
mergers/acquisitions as well as joint ventures/strategic alliances rather than internal
development. Such modes of diversification implied that the company was unwilling to
undertake the high risks and slow process of building new organizations under a purely
internal development mode [Ramanujam and Varadarajan 1989; Penrose 1995J.
The balance between risk-taking and risk-aversion was also manifested in Ayala
Corporation's financial management. An analysis of Ayala Corporation's performance
for the 23-year period would reveal the attainment of generally modest rates of return on
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equity (ROE), the use of fair levels of debt, and the maintenance of more than sufficient
amounts of liquid assets to pay for short-term liabilities (see Appendix 3 ).6)
Yet how then did Ayala attain rapid growth during the period if the ROEs as well as
the use of debt and external equity were modest? Aside from the use of large amounts
of retained earnings for expansion, one reason was that financial management was
aggressive when it came to subsidiary companies, especially non-financial ones. More-
over, careful selection of businesses in the portfolio allowed the parent company to
generate large revenues and earnings.
The results of the analysis showed that while the parent company was highly solvent
and profitable, subsidiary companies tended to use more debt if net profit margins were
lower which in the sample tended to be the case. Even here, financial management by
Ayala had not been reckless. To control for risk at the subsidiary level, high levels of
liquidity were usually observed to cover up all liabilities, both short-term and long-term
(Appendix 4). This strategy was consistent to that of the parent company's management
of its own liquidity. In the process, Ayala Corporation could realize high ROEs from its
subsidiaries, as long as the latter continued to generate sufficient cash flow to cover for
all of its debts, short-term and long-term.
But the period 1981-83 showed a dangerous situation for AC's financial condition.
The growth in costs and expenses was faster than revenues during the years 1982 and
1983. Of the increased costs, the rise in interest charges was the most threatening given
the trend of bankruptcy among many Philippine conglomerates due to poor liquidity and
rising interest rates.
Against this highly uncertain environment of the early 1980s, Ayala's share of
interest expense to total costs (called here as the interest expense ratio) rose threaten-
ingly to 22 percent in 1983 (Fig. 5). At any time afterwards, when interest rates in the
Philippines went up to 45 percent to 50 percent during the 1983-85 period, AC's interest
burden would have increased. That would have taken a toll on the company's further
expansion, if not its own survival as a family business.
Increased interest burden was accompanied by the unfavorable trend in the ratio of
dividends to retained earnings, otherwise called as retention ratio (Fig. 6). Between 1981
and 1983, dividends ranged from about 40 percent to 90 percent of retained earnings. This
situation threatened to cut earnings ploughed-back as capital to finance future expansion
and contingencies. Thus, Ayala's interest expense and dividend ratios for this period
showed a trend of increasing reliance on external sources of capital for expansion, both
6) It will be noted that in 1991 Ayala Corporation adopted a system of reporting financial
statements on a consolidated basis. Previously, the financial statements only reflected
those of the parent company. According to Ayala's external auditors, the accounting
change increased the parent company's total assets and liabilities as well as total revenues
and expenses but has no effect on net income or stockholders' equity, which means that
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Fig. 5 Share of Interest Expense to Total Costs, Ayala Corp., 1974-96
Source: [Ayala Corporation 1975-1996J
Fig. 6 Ratio of Dividends to Retained Earnings, Ayala Corp., 1974-96
Source: [Ayala Corporation 1975-1996J
34
E. V. C. BATALLA: Zaibatsu Development in the Philippines
in terms of equity and debt.
Despite the financial problems of several subsidiaries induding AIDC and manufac-
turing firms, the Enzo administration continued to have an increasing dividend pay-
ments policy and at the same, an aggressive corporate acquisitions program, including
the failed takeover of San Miguel Corporation in the first quarter of 1983. These were
dangerous signs of over-expansion and, in expanding, top management was relying less
on internal sources of capital.
As expected, the majority owners (the McMickings) were very averse to unnecessary
risks associated with the expansion of their company. In the years following Enzo's
replacement in 1983, both retention and interest expense ratios of the parent company
dropped to significantly low levels (although as mentioned in 1991, the company began
reporting on a consolidated accounting basis which resulted in the increased interest
ratios for the Ayala Group as a whole).
V Management Control System and Historical Antecedents
The above findings lead to the question why such risk-averse behaviors were strongly
manifested in a continuing high growth process and how deviant behaviors were
checked. There are historical antecedents to Ayala's risk behavior, which are provided in
the following discussion of the company's ownership-management system.
1. Ownership and Mathematical Control of the Company
When the company was a partnership, family members could enter or exit as partners
based on family consensus. When a partner wanted out, he or she sold the shares back
to the company. This preserved the ownership within the family as well as control of the
firm within active family members. For instance, Jacobo Zobel, Enzo's father, sold his
shares in Ayala because of his preference for the military. This was why Enzo had to buy
himself in on loans from the McMickings [Lachica 1984: 157].
Many years before the company transformed from a simple family firm to a major
zaibatsu, evidence from one of ]RM's speeches indicated that he had already considered
different types of contro1.7l Accordingly, there were two types of control by which the
family could still direct the activities of the growing firm. These were mathematical and
7) As articulated in his speech entitled, "The New Managers," delivered before the Mandaluyong
Chamber of Commerce, 8 September 1961. In that speech, he said that if the business
becomes bigger than company capitalization could support, "the next step is to raise
money from the public, trying to maintain mathematical control in the family." Keeping
operating control could be done when mathematical control had to be relinquished due to
more public financing. Accordingly, "operating control is workable only so long as an
alliance of stockholders doesn't get together to unseat the regime." Operating without
mathematical control thus bred a delicate situation, which AC did not get into.
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operating control. Mathematical control pertained to ownership of stocks and therefore
participation in the board of directors. Operating control referred to systems by which
managers could work for the interests of both firm and family. Both types of control
were strictly observed in the course of AC's growth and expansion.
When the firm switched from a partnership to corporation, exclusive ownership was
eventually surrendered but with the family possessing mathematical control through
majority ownership by Mermac. This control logic was replicated in subsidiary and
affiliate companies, thus minimizing the disadvantages and social criticisms against the
closed, exclusive ownership setup common among several large family firms. Although
by no means the best and only arrangement, the solid ownership system effectively
countered threats coming from family members. Enzo's replacement led to stock owner-
ship transfers within AC.
2. Organizational Stability and Operating Control
The number of family members in the company had been extremely limited. From 1975
to 1996, the number of family members (including the president) in top management as
well as the board of directors never exceeded three. Thus, the family had to ensure that
top managers worked for their business interests. For this purpose, certain stability and
control mechanisms were employed.
In terms of stability, first, a paternalistic management system was followed. Prior to
his retirement, Salvador Lorayes, AC's first corporate secretary said that he had never
regretted not leaving the company because among family corporations, Ayala was
unique in that "all employees are given a fair share" [Lachina 1984: 157J. Paternalistic
management was also based on a system of lifetime employment. Lorayes started work
at AC in 1941 since his high school graduation. Work there was his first and last.
Moreover, Koike [1993b: 457J observed, "The professional managers who have become
Ayala Corp. senior vice-presidents are almost all people who have been actively involved
in the Ayala Group's affairs since they were vice-presidents in the 1970s." Similarly, there
were others who remained as vice-presidents during the same length of time. This would
suggest the stability generally achieved by the company in terms of retaining its top-
level human resources.
Second, a mandatory retirement policy at the age of 60 provided new generation
managers with incentives for upward mobility. This was justified by JRM [l956bJ as
follows:
We think that another important thing to hold a capable young man in our organization is his
conviction that not only preselected insiders get to the top. And more importantly, when a man
reaches the top, he doesn't remain forever until dead, mentally or physically. We have adopted
a retirement age of sixty. This may be young for some people but for a line job, for direct
operations, the premium is on youth. We want our young executive to feel that his future will
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not be bottled up. We may retain the exceptional man after age 60 for staff functions but not
for a line job.
In terms of operating control, AC employed certain structures, routines and ideolog-
ical properties. First, an executive committee was set up to discuss policy decisions. This
committee was composed of representatives from the Ayala family, AC and Mitsubishi.
In 1976, two committee members were Zobels (the chairman and vice-chairman). One
member represented Mitsubishi interests and two other regular members were AC
insiders. Before being phased out after 1990, there were only three regular committee
members.
Second, during Jaime's term as president, a management committee was set up to
replace the executive committee and thereupon handle issues at the Group-level, mainly
regarding urgent and strategic directions for the Ayala group. The management commit-
tee consisted of special representatives and top managers of Ayala's lead businesses.
Usually, two members of the Zobel family belonged to the management committee. From
9-members in 1991, the management committee's composition increased to 12. Fernando
Zobel, J AZA's brother, joined it in preparation of Jaime's impending retirement as
chairman.
Third, further control was ensured at individual businesses while allowing for man-
agerial initiative. Below the Group level, Ayala's organizational structure as presented
by Ferrer [1990J would suggest that the control system actually had what Peters and
Waterman [1982J called loose-tight properties. Loose management properties were
indicated by a decentralized structure whose lead directors 8) were given sufficient
decision "leeway" [Marasigan 1994: 28].
However, at the same time, internal and external control functions were dispersed in
various corporate departments. The Strategic Planning Group appeared to have most of
the internal control functions. Through this department, AC usually posted chief
financial officers (CFO) to subsidiary and affiliate companies [Koike 1993b: 456]. They
were tasked to assess and report the financial state of affairs of the subsidiary or affiliate
where they worked for, reporting to the president of that subsidiary jaffiliate. The CFO's
then formally reported to AC's comptroller.9) In turn, the comptroller (who also heads the
8) A lead director administered a designated business area, which was an umbrella of com-
panies engaged in related businesses, e. g., insurance. The lead director concurrently held
the position of president of some of the companies within this umbrella.
9) In other companies, the comptroller (or controller) would have the following responsibili-
ties: 1) design of the accounting system, 2) operation of the accounting system, 3) tax
planning and accounting, 4) budgets and budgetary control, 5) internal audit, and 6)
operational review. See for instance, Carl Moore, Robert K. Jaedicke, and Lane K.
Anderson [1984: 3-4]. At Ayala, not all of these functions were vested in the comptroller.
For instance, internal audit was placed under the corporate secretary's Board Staff. Like-
wise, operational review was more of a group process.
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Strategic Planning Group) reported to Ayala Corporation's top management.
Other departments also exercised control functions including internal audit by the
Board Staff, treasury by the Office of the Treasurer, general services and human resource
by Corporate Services. Further, Strategic Planning, Corporate Services and Board Staff
also had functions that guarded the Group against external threats, e. g., from the media
or hostile external parties.
Finally, the family's continued dominance in the course of expansion was aided by
ideological control. Realizing that future management would be in the hands of non-
family managers, JRM [1961] emphasized "stewardship" among AC's managers, both
family and non-family members alike as could be gathered from the following passage:
Following the loss of operating control by a family group of owner-stockholders, management
transfers to professional managers. These men, coming from the ranks or through technical
and business schools, assume the responsibilities and prerogatives of owners. Not understand-
ing the "stewardship" responsibility of their position, they sometimes act with arrogance and
disdain for public good and stockholder benefit. But generally, high caliber men react well as
professional managers. When their background is sound and they have been properly in-
doctrinated, they realize that they are only temporary Trustees (underscoring mine).
Thus top managers were screened for their loyalty, diligence and intelligence to
become guardians-stewards-of the family's wealth. This was confirmed by JZA who
following his succession, reorganized management and said [jZA 1995: 5 ], "Certain qual-
ities were essential in successfully confronting any situation: loyalty, intelligence and the
sure touch of long experience."
JRM [1956a] also revealed that "stewardship" was part of the training received from
previous family managers as follows:
When you are connected with an organization that is steeped in long tradition, you take it for
granted that the organization will live into the future as much as it has existed in the past. The
elders under whom I had my training constantly reminded me that the future would be assured
only if we could think in terms of decades, instead of putting undue weight in the immediate
future. I was told that what we administer today was the fruit of the efforts of predecessors
who 20 or 40 or 60 years ago believed in the future of the country. Following the same road, my
job today is to train successors along the traditions and line of thinking that I was trained, and
to develop within the limits of my capabilities, new projects which my successors will admin-
ister 20 and 40 and 60 years from now.
The preceding discussion indicated that, from selection and promotion up to individ-
ual performance, institutionalized mechanisms were enforced for the family's continued
control of managerial behavior and activities.
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VI Non-Partisan Politics
Risk avoidance was further extended in the political realm where 1) no family member
joined electoral politics and 2) family and firm rejected the use of political influence for
rent seeking. As a matter of policy and tradition, AC declared its rejection of the
indiscriminate use of political influence for private gain [Ferrer 1990: 81]. Further, family
managers shied away from partisan politics, perhaps because of the traumatic experi-
ences during the Spanish colonial period that involved various members of the family.IO)
In the first half of the 20th century, family members mixed with politicians and govern-
ment administrators but did not use these connections to expand their empire.
JRM had been adamantly against such rent-seeking activities, which characterized
many a Filipino entrepreneur. He considered government support to be not only
"paternalistic" but also "self-defeating." Friends were telling him that firms of Ayala's
size could not do without political power, even for protection. In response to friends who
insisted on Ayala's political involvement, JRM said, "In all the years I have been in
business, I neither solicited nor received any direct government support or political
assistance, and I have found that I can do without it" [Dumlao 1969: 14].
However JRM believed in the citizen's right and obligation to express his or her
views towards good government [loc. cit.]. Enzo and j2A also expressed their views as
representatives of the business community. During the height of the civil disobedience
movement against Marcos, based on his message to stockholders in the 1985 annual
report, jZA encouraged employees and officers to exercise their right of expression
although the company "as an institution did not adopt a partisan attitude."
During elections, the Ayala management appeared to take a neutral stance although
it financially supported some candidates. Neutrality meant that there was no clear
affiliation with any presidential candidate. During the early Marcos era, critical collabo-
ration strategies were adopted such as those described during the Enzo administration.
jZA and his family clearly supported President Aquino and President Ramos but there
were no news reports implicating family members and AC executives in regard to
obtaining special government favors. In fact, during these two presidential administra-
tions, there were a number of conflicts reported between AC and government agencies
like the Securities and Exchange Commission. In what ways therefore Ayala family and
firm members engaged in politics remained ambiguous. Still, a low degree of political
involvement was observed.
10) These included Domingo Roxas and Antonio de Ayala who were implicated in a local
uprising and hence imprisoned. Roxas died in jail, Roxas grandchild, Pedro Roxas, was
also accused of supporting the Philippine revolution. He went to exile in Europe but
Spanish government authorities seized his properties in the Philippines. All three were
cleared of charges against them.
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VII Concluding Comments
In the process of growth, serious threats to the family firm's continuity arise. Continuity
is based on the preservation of family ownership and management. Agency theory
[Jensen and Meckling 1976J for instance suggests that the managers' ("agent") tendency to
over-expand the scope and size of the firm leads to conflicts with stockholders ("princi-
pal") since this raises the risk of transferring firm control from existing stockholders to
bondholders (or creditors) and new stockholders. Some growing family firms tend to be
swayed by the temptation of firm expansion at the expense of continued firm ownership
and control.
The risk factor to continuity could be extended to the political realm where threats
to ownership-management independence come from the developing country govern-
ment. In Park Chung Hee's Korea, for instance, the activities of large family conglomer-
ates were often aligned with the government's national development agenda. Moreover,
in many developing countries, business families either provided financial support to
political candidates or even encourage family members to join politics. Empirical
evidence [McCoy 1994; Morikawa 1992J showed that the closer the nexus with govern-
ment, the lower the chances of survival since favors derived from one political adminis-
tration could change to disfavor in another administration.
Ayala's business history represents a zaibatsu that became the largest in the Philip-
pines without characteristically using political favors for its enlargement. This contrasts
with the largest zaibatsu in prewar Japan (Mitsui and Mitsubishi) and South Korea
(Samsung) and even Indonesia (Salim) and Thailand (Bangkok Bank) all of which have
histories of characteristically utilizing government support and favors to enlarge their
business empires. ll )
There are at least four reasons that could be surmised for Ayala's rejection of
political favors. First, as pointed out earlier, there were traditions and policy based on
previous traumatic experiences. Second, during the first half of the 20th century, the
managing partners did not seem to be interested in expanding the company's scope since
they were preoccupied in insurance and civic activities. Third, the risks inherent in
11) There are several works pointing to the government-zaibatsu relationship in modern Japan.
Pieces of this relationship could be found in corporate biographies written in English,
particularly those by Roberts [1989J and Mishima [1989]. Historians also underscored this
relationship, e. g., in Morikawa [1992J, Allen [1980J and Hirschmeier and Yui [1975]. The
close relationship between government and chaebol in South Korea is also well-known and
well-researched accounts about Sarnsung could be read from Jones and Sakong [1980J and
Kim [1988]. For Indonesia's Salim group, Sato [1993J provides a good history. Finally,
Suehiro [1989J discusses the alliance of Thai's Big Four including the Bangkok Bank group
(or Asia Trust headed by the Chin family) with the military and political establishment.
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seeking political favors would defeat the purpose of "stewardship," which has been
ingrained in the minds of family leaders and non-family executives. Finally, in the latter
half of the century, there was no need to ask for government favors since empire-building
aspirations could be achieved by excess funds derived from Makati's successful develop-
ment.
The Ayala model further shows the continuing role of the family in zaibatsu owner-
ship and management. Generations of family managers have succeeded to keep manage-
ment control. Even as the family firm diversified to significant proportions, a great deal
of organizational stability has been generally ensured by preventing any serious diver-
gence of principal-agent interests. This would explain why for instance securing exter-
nal financing for growth has been kept at very manageable levels in the parent company.
If there were serious agency problems such as that had transpired during Enzo's admin-
istration, the firm's majority owners have proved decisive in replacing top executives,
both family and non-family members alike.
Even within the family, ownership, on the one hand, and management, on the other,
was somehow separated. This represented two potentially conflicting parties since the
firm's growth would be in the best interests of family managers while profit were usually
in the majority owners' best interests [Marris 1963]. The unifying elements between the
two were institutional and ideological. First, principal-agent problems were reduced
since individual family managers also owned substantial shares in the company. Second,
family members were driven by the responsibilities of stewardship. Stewardship as an
organizational ideology has worked to conserve capital and look forward to the future. It
makes managers more keenly conscious of risks.
In terms of entrepreneurship, each generation has been able to contribute to the
firm's growth. It is entrepreneurs like Enzo which expanded the Ayala business empire.
From there, the breadth and depth of AC's portfolio could be attributed to both family
and non-family executives. Thus, while stewardship preserves capital, entrepreneurship
seeks its creation and growth. Indeed, there is a delicate balance between the two but as
one Ayala executive noted, "The key is in the numbers and planning."
This paper has attempted to provide an empirical base as well as an interpretation
for Ayala's development as a zaibatsu. The investigation of patterns of its recent
development as a conglomerate leads to the underscoring of the role of stewardship,
which have historical antecedents in the company's ownership-management system.
The tentative conclusion reached is that stewardship guides the direction of en-
trepreneurship as well as family-firm relationships. The quality of stewardship offers to
explain why some family firms survive and fall in the course of time and expansion. The
stronger the practice of stewardship in a particular generation, the better its chances for
survival as far as ownership-management is concerned. It is not therefore inevitable for
some family firms to transform into financial or managerial enterprises in the process of
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PIERRE (B.I",) (B. I.) SUSANA (B. 1962) (B. 1964) (B. 1967) (B. 1968) SAN11AGO GONZAW- INIGO INES
CALANO M. EUZABE11I (B. 1961) M. JUAN ENRJQUE XANDRA INIGO MARIA (B. 1971) FERNANDO JAIME DIANA
(B. 1957) EDER M. JUAN URQUIJO HERRERA (B. 1958) (B. 1960) (B. 1965) (B. 1976) (B. 1979)
(B. 1958) (B. 1958) M. JAIMEI BASAlDUA
JAIME LUIS I
(B. 1988) SANDRA EDUARDO
(B. 1986) (B. 1987)
Source: [Lachica 1985; Koike 1991 ]
Notes: B-Birthyear; D-Deathyear; and M-married. Bold letters mark managing family members.
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Appendix 3 Financial Highlights and Performance Indicators, Ayala Corporation, 1974-96































































































































































































































II. Financial Performance Indicators
Year Total Liabilities



























































































































Net Profit as % Current Assets to






























Source: [Ayala Corporation 1975-1996J
Notes: 1. From 1985 to 1990, figures based on equity method of accounting for investments in
companies where it owned 20 percent or more of the investee's stocks.
2. From 1991 to 1996, figures are based on consolidated financial statements.
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Appendix 4 Performance of 11 Non-Financial Subsidiaries, Ayala Corporation, 1986-93
I. Current Assets as Multiple of Total Liabilities
Name of Subsidiary 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Makati Development Corporation 1.7 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.5
IMI 1.6 1.5 1.3
Gold Zack 1.5 1.3 1.8 1.9
Batangas Bay Carriers 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.6
AADC 1.9 2.2 2.6 1.6 1.8
GMCR i.o 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.4 1.4
ALI 2.2 2.7 5.7 6.3 3.7
Ayala Property Ventures 271.0 30.8
ll. Total Liabilities as % of Total Assets
Name of Subsidiary 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Makati Development Corporation 49.0% 50.3% 54.5% 75.3% 79.1% 80.8% 66.4% 57.1%
IMI 52.9% 38.7% 34.2% 39.5% 42.5%
ASTI 37.9%
Gold Zack 65.8% 56.3% 53.1% 59.8% 41.7% 43.1%
Ayala Property Management Corp. 89.8% 88.9%
Ayala Theaters Management Inc. 85.4% 77.6%
Batangas Bay Carriers 91.9% 91.5% 87.9% 86.4% 91.4% 90.1%
AADC 55.6% 47.5% 39.1% 38.7% 33.4% 55.0% 47.6% 39.6%
GMCR 16.2% 48.5% 55.5% 57.1% 68.1% 68.8% 63.8% 34.3%
ALI 46.3% 37.4% 17.6% 15.9% 26.7%
AHI 25.2% 0.9%
Ayala Property Ventures 0.4% 3.2%
ill. Profit Margin (Net Profit as % of Total Sales)
Name of Subsidiary 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Makati Development Corporation 3.9% 6.7% 4.6% 5.5% 3.0% 3.5% 6.7% 10.9%
IMI 2.9% 10.9% 11.5% 4.9% 3.0%
ASTI 0.6%
Gold Zack - 1.7% 11.8% 11.2% 8.5% 7.6% 9.0%
Ayala Property Management Corp. 0.1% 0.8%
Ayala Theaters Management Inc. 10.2% 9.1%
Batangas Bay Carriers 2.3% 3.2% 9.1% 2.3% - 1.2% 2.9%
AADC 6.8% 10.8% 18.3% 16.8% 21.4% - 52.0% - 13.3% 7.9%
GMCR 45.3% 31.5% 25.3% 21.2% 14.3% 12.6% - 31.4% - 23.4%
ALI 45.0% 43.2% 41.3% 40.3% 40.9%
AHI 83.0% 61.9%
Ayala Property Ventures 72.2% 65.3%
IV. Returns on Equity (Net Profit as % of Common Equity)
Name of Subsidiary 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Makati Development Corporation 10.6% 24.5% 22.4% 28.9% 21.6% 30.4% 22.6% 25.1%
IMI 7.5% 20.3% 22.7% 8.5% 4.1%
ASTI 1.2%
Gold Zack - 8.8% 46.6% 44.6% 32.3% 24.8% 35.4%
Ayala Property Management Corp. 10.9% 9.8%
Ayala Theaters Management Inc. 83.5% 47.2%
Batangas Bay Carriers 12.1% 21.7% 63.1% 15.9% - 13.5% 28.7%
AADC 13.1% 22.7% 37.3% 27.2% 33.3% - 53.6% - 29.9% 16.1%
GMCR 38.1% 41.0% 35.3% 30.1% 20.3% 17.1% - 21.1% - 4.0%
ALI 5.1% 37.4% 12.2% 14.2% 13.9%
AHI 18.1% 4.5%
Ayala Property Ventures 5.1% 9.4%
Source: [Mahal Kong Pilipinas Foundation 1987-1994J
Note: Blanks indicate that the company was not included in top 1000 Corporations for that year.
Some companies excluded from current assets as multiple of total liabilities because of no
reported data.
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Ayala Agricultural Development Corporation
Ayala Corporation or Ayala y Compania (Ayala y Cia)
Ayala Investment & Development Corporation
Ayala Hotels, Inc.
Ayala Insurance Holdings, Inc.
Ayala Land, Inc.
Ayala Systems Technology, Inc.
Bank of the Philippine Islands
Enrique Zobel y Olgado
Integrated Microelectronics, Inc.
Joseph R. McMicking
Jaime Zobel de Ayala
Jaime Augusto Zobel de Ayala
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